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THE STATE ACTION EXEMPTION FOR
STATE AGENTS-IMMUNITY WITHOUT
EXAMINATION OF THE AGENT'S
CONDUCT: HOOVER V. RONWIN
The federal antitrust laws were intended to eliminate the cor-
ruptive and injurious practices of conspiracies and monopolies."
The purpose of the Sherman Antitrust Act (the Sherman Act), for
instance, was to prohibit contracts, combinations, and conspiracies
in restraint of trade.2 Although the broad language of the Sherman
Act contains no exceptions to its coverage,3 the Supreme Court has
I L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST 14 (1977). Typically, trusts and
monopolies would lower prices to drive out competition; then, when no competition existed,
prices would be increased drastically. See 1 J. VON KALINOWSKI, ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE
REGULATION § 2.02[2][b] (1979); Letwin, Congress and the Sherman Antitrust Law: 1887-
1890, 23 U. CHL L. REV. 221, 235 (1956). Watered stock, payroll padding, graft, and bribery
among local and national officials were associated with the anticompetitive methods em-
ployed by trusts. R. MORRISON, THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 729-33
(1965). The use of predatory and coercive pricing led to a public outcry for a federal rem-
edy. 1 J. VON KALINOWSKI, supra, § 2.02[3] [a]; Limbaugh, Historic Origins of Antitrust Liti-
gation, 18 Mo. L. REV. 215, 246 (1953). The public opposition was so intense that Senator
Sherman felt debate on the subject was unnecessary when introducing the bill that later
became the Sherman Antitrust Act. 21 CONG. REC. 2456 (1890).
2 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982); infra note 11; see Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1,
4 (1958); see also P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW % 103 (2d ed. 1978); R. BORE, THE
ANTITRUST PARADOX 66-71 (1979); R. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 4
(1976).
Senator Sherman first brought the antitrust bill to the floor of Congress in 1888.
Letwin, supra note 1, at 249. After two years and a number of different bills, see id. at 251-
52, Senator Sherman introduced his new bill that would "declare unlawful trusts and combi-
nations in restraint of trade," 21 CONG. REC. 2456 (1890). Senator Sherman stated that the
objective of the bill was to outlaw combinations which can break down competition. Id. at
2457.
The Supreme Court has stated that the purpose of the Sherman Act is "to use constitu-
tional power to make .... so far as Congress could under our dual system, a competitive
business economy." United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 559
(1944) (footnote omitted); see Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 493 (1940) (Sher-
man Act sought to prevent restraints on "free competition in business and commercial
transactions which tended to restrict production, raise prices or otherwise control the mar-
ket to the detriment of purchasers or consumers of goods and services . . ").
' See United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 350-51 (1963); California
v. Federal Power Comm'n, 369 U.S. 482, 485 (1962). Unfortunately, the Sherman Act does
not expressly indicate whether exemptions for sovereign activities were intended. 1 P.
AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 2, 211.
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held that it was not meant to apply to the anticompetitive activi-
ties of states." Acts of the legislature, and of the state supreme
court when acting in a legislative capacity, are considered acts of
the state and, therefore, are not subject to antitrust scrutiny.'
Among the many recognized partial exemptions that are either expressly legislated, im-
plied from regulation, or judicially created are labor unions, professional baseball, airlines,
railroads, and atomic energy licensing. See S. OPPENHEIM, G. WESTON & J. MCCARTHY, FED-
ERAL ANTITRUST LAWS 30 n.43 (4th ed. 1981); see also Pogue, Antitrust Exemptions, 33
A.B.A. ANTITRUST L.J. 1, 2-3 (1967) (listing and ratiom-le cf exemptions).
' See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351 -2 (1943). Although Parker has been called
the "genesis" of the state action immunity doctrine, see ANTITRUST AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT
15 (R. Siena ed. 1982), the seeds of Parker were sown in two earlier cases that granted
exemptions from antitrust suits, see Handler, Twenty-fourth Annual Antitrust Review, 72
COLUM. L. REv. 1, 4 (1972). In Lowenstein v. Evans, 69 F. 908 (C.C.D.S.C. 1895), the South
Carolina Circuit Court held that state monopolization of liquor trafficking did not violate
the Act because the state made no contract, entered into no combination or conspiracy, and
was neither a corporation nor a person. 69 F. at 911. Nine years later, a similar issue was
decided by the Supreme Court in Olsen v. Smith, 195 U.S. 332 (1904). In Olsen, the Court
stated that "no monopoly or combination in a legal sense" could arise under duly authorized
state regulatory procedures. 195 U.S. at 345 (dictum).
In Parker v. Brown, the plaintiff sought to enjoin enforcement of a state agricultural
program which restricted the production of raisins in order to stabilize their market price.
317 U.S. at 349-50. The Court held that although section one of the Sherman Act obviously
applied to private anticompetitive business actions, the Act did not address state action:
"[w]e find nothing in the language of the Sherman Act or in its history which suggest[s] that
its purpose was to restrain a state or its officers or agents from activities directed by its
legislature." Id. at 350-51. The Parker Court created a state action exemption premised
upon the conception that governmental programs do not "operate by force of individual
agreement or combination." Id. at 350; see Slater, Antitrust and Government Action: A
Formula for Narrowing Parker v. Brown, 69 Nw. U.L. REv. 82 (1974); Note, Of Raisins and
Mushrooms: Applying the Parker Antitrust Exemption, 58 VA. L. REV. 1511, 1514-15
(1972); Comment, State Action and the Sherman Antitrust Act: Should the Antitrust Laws
Be Given a Preemptive Effect?, 14 CONN. L. REv. 135, 139-40 (1981).
The state action exemption born in Parker has resulted in a confusing array of cases
that make predicting antitrust liability quite risky. See Handler, Antitrust-1978, 78
COLUM. L. REV. 1363, 1378 (1978). The concern over the confusion engendered by the amor-
phous bounds of the state action doctrine has prompted one commentator to suggest that a
congressional response is necessary. Handler, Reforming the Antitrust Laws, 82 COLUM. L.
REv. 1287, 1338 (1982) (Congress must "intervene and indicate to what extent it intends
antitrust to apply to state action"). In response to such sentiment, the Local Government
Antitrust Act of 1984 was enacted to prevent monetary damages from being awarded in
antitrust suits based on the official conduct of local governments while, at the same time,
preserving injunctive remedies. Local Government Antitrust Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-
544.
, See 1 P. ARREDA & D. TURNER, supra note 2, 1 214a; P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS §
181(c) (3d ed. 1981). In Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351-52 (1943), the state legislature
was granted immunity for its actions. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. A state
supreme court, when acting in a legislative capacity, also has been granted immunity. See
Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 359, 359-63 (1977). Immunity has been denied to state bar
associations, see Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 791-92 (1975), municipalities,
see Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 49-51 (1982); City of
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Since 1975, when the Supreme Court narrowed the scope of the
state action exemption, immunity has been granted to state agents
only when an examination reveals that the activities in question
were carried out pursuant to state policy.6 Recently, however, in
Hoover v. Ronwin,1 the Supreme Court, without such an examina-
tion, extended the state action exemption to members of the Ari-
zona Supreme Court's Committee on Examination and Admissions
(Committee), holding that the allegedly anticompetitive grading
procedure of the Committee was actually the conduct of the Ari-
Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435. U.S. 389, 408-13 (1978), and public utility
companies, see Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 595-98 (1976). See generally
Richards, Exploring the Far Reaches of the State Action Exemption: Implications for Fed-
eralism, 57 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 274 (1983) (attitude of present Court "enables responsible
judicial application of. . . federal antitrust laws while simultaneously permitting. . . states
and localities to maintain an active role within . . . federal system").
6 See Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 791-92 (1975); see also infra note 69.
Prior to Goldfarb, the state action protection had been freely granted to government entities
by the lower federal courts, often with little or no consideration of the policy behind the
state action or the relationship between the state action and the federal law. ANTITRUST AND
LocAL GOVERNMENT 15 (R. Siena ed. 1982); see, e.g., Gas Light Co. v. Georgia Power Co.,
440 F.2d 1135, 1140 (5th Cir. 1971) (state practices eliminated gas as an energy source com-
petitive with electricity), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1062 (1972); E.W. Wiggins Airways, Inc. v.
Massachusetts Port Auth., 362 F.2d 52 (1st Cir.) (state agency granted monopoly at airport),
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 947 (1966). Indeed, this protection was often extended to private
parties acting under the guise of state authorization. See Note, Parker v. Brown Revisited:
The State Action Doctrine After Goldfarb, Cantor, and Bates, 77 COLUM. L. Rav. 898, 900-
02 (1977).
In the six state-action cases since Goldfarb, the Supreme Court has focused on whether
the anticompetitive conduct was intended by the State. See infra notes 29-32 and accompa-
nying text. In Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976), the inquiry concerned an
allegedly anticdmpetitive program approved by a state utility commission. Id. at 581. The
examination in Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977), involved a state supreme court disci-
plinary rule. Id. at 354-55. In City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389
(1978), the alleged attempts of a city to restrict competition were at issue. Id. at 392 n.6. In
New Motor Vehicle Bd. v. Orrin W. Fox, the Court's investigation centered on the Califor-
nia Automobile Franchise Act. See 439 U.S. 96, 109 (1978). A California regulation requiring
wine producers to file fair trade contracts was questioned in California Retail Liquor Deal-
ers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 99 (1980). In Community Communications
Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40 (1982), the Court looked at whether the state action
exemption was applicable to parties acting under a home-rule provision of the Colorado
Constitution. Id. at 43. It is not dispositive of the state action question that the challenged
restraints are enforced by a state commission, see, e.g., Parker, 317 U.S. at 344, a state
board, see, e.g., Fox, 439 U.S. at 103, or a state department, see, e.g., Midcal, 445 U.S. at
100. Even if there is active state control, supervision, or involvement in the activity, there is
no Parker immunity unless the protected activity falls within the scope of the authority
delegated to the agency. Comment, The State Action Exemption in Antitrust: From Parker
v. Brown to Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 1977 DuKE L.J. 371, 388.
7 104 S. Ct. 1989 (1984).
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zona Supreme Court.'
In Ronwin, the plaintiff, Edward Ronwin, took the Arizona
State Bar Exam in 1974 and failed.9 After Ronwin's petition for
review to the Arizona Supreme Court was dismissed,10 he initiated
an antitrust action in the district court against members of the
Committee, alleging that they had conspired to restrain trade in
violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act 1 by artificially limiting
the number of attorneys competing in the State of Arizona.12 The
district court dismissed the complaint, holding, inter alia, that
Ronwin had failed to state a justiciable claim because the Commit-
tee was immune from federal antitrust laws.13 On appeal, the
Ninth Circuit reversed the dismissal, holding that for purposes of
the antitrust immunity, the challenged grading procedure failed to
qualify as state action. 4
A divided Supreme Court 15 reversed and upheld the state ac-
8 Id. at 1998.
1 Id. at 1993.
10 Id. An applicant who is aggrieved by a decision of the Committee may seek review of
the manner in which the exam was conducted and graded. Id. at 1992 n.8. After his petition
was denied by the Arizona Supreme Court for the third time, id. at 1933, Ronwin sought
review by the United States Supreme Court, which denied certiorari. See Ronwin v. Com-
mittee on Examinations and Admissions of the Sup. Ct. of Ariz., 419 U.S. 967 (1974).
11 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982). In pertinent part, § 1 of the Sherman Act provides: "Every
contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade
or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal." Id.
12 104 S. Ct. at 1993-94. Ronwin's complaint alleged that he was "artificially prevented
from entering into competition as an attorney in the State of Arizona and thereby deprived
of the right to compete ... for ... legal business .... " Id. at 1994 n.13.
13 See Ronwin v. State Bar, 686 F.2d 692, 695 (9th Cir. 1982). The district court, in an
unpublished opinion, dismissed the action for the following reasons: (1) the complaint failed
to state a claim upon which relief could be granted; (2) the court lacked jurisdiction over the
subject matter; and (3) Ronwin did not have standing to seek the relief he requested. Id.
14 Id. at 698. Judge Hatter, writing for the majority, stated that "absent a clear articu-
lation by the Arizona Supreme Court that it had adopted the alleged grading policy,"
Ronwin should have been given the opportunity to prove that the grading policy was an-
ticompetitive. Id.
The Ninth Circuit found that the establishment of the Committee and the selection of
its members by the supreme court were not dispositive of the state action question. Id. at
697. In contrast to the requirement enunciated in California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v.
Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105 (1980), that the matter be clearly articulated and
affirmatively expressed as a state policy, the Ninth Circuit noted that there was no such
expression of state policy advising the Committee to grade the examinations to admit a
predetermined number of applicants, 686 F.2d at 697.
"I See 104 S. Ct. at 2003. Justice Powell delivered the opinion of the Court in which
Chief Justice Burger and Justices Brennan and Marshall joined. Justice Stevens dissented
in an opinion in which Justices White and Blackmun joined. Justices Rehnquist and
O'Connor took no part in the decision. Id.
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tion exemption for the Committee.16 Justice Powell, writing for the
majority, determined that the alleged limitations on the number of
applicants admitted to the bar fell within the ambit of Parker v.
Brown.17 According to the majority, Parker was applicable because
the activities of the Committee were actually those of the Arizona
Supreme Court.18 The critical factor, the Court observed, was that
under Arizona law only the state supreme court had the authority
to admit or deny applicants to the state bar.19 In addition, the ma-
jority found Ronwin to be analogous to Bates v. State Bar of Ari-
zona, in which the Court upheld the state action exemption for a
state bar association enforcing anticompetitive disciplinary rules.21
Justice Powell reasoned that since the Arizona Supreme Court "re-
tained strict supervisory powers and ultimate full authority" 22 over
the Committee's actions, Ronwin was in fact challenging the con-
duct of the court.23
Dissenting, Justice Stevens contended that the Parker exemp-
tion was inapplicable because the Arizona Supreme Court was not
126 Id. at 2002-03.
17 Id. at 1997.
18 Id. at 1998. The majority noted that after grading the examination, "the Committee's
authority was limited to making recommendations to the Supreme Court." Id. at 1997-98.
Thus, according to the majority, Ronwin was denied admission by the Arizona Supreme
Court. Id. at 1998. Rather than challenge his denial, however, Ronwin challenged the grad-
ing policy designed by the Committee, alleging that the "scaled" grading formula was used
to restrain competition. See id. at 1996 n.19.
19 See id. at 1999. The Committee on Examinations and Admissions was established by
the Arizona Supreme Court pursuant to the authority vested in the court to determine who
should be admitted to practice law in the state. Id. at 1991. The Arizona Constitution grants
the court the power to delegate this responsibility to the Committee. Hunt v. Maricopa
County Employees Merit Sys. Comm'n., 127 Ariz. 259, 261, 619 P.2d 1036, 1038-39 (1980);
see ARxz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32-275 (1976). The Arizona Supreme Court Rules provide for the
Committee to examine applicants to the bar and recommend for admission those that are
deemed to be qualified. 104 S. Ct. at 1992 (citing ARiz. Sup. CT. RuLE 28(a) (1973)). The
rules reserve to the court the ultimate authority to grant or deny admission, but grant the
Committee discretion in compiling a grading and scoring system subject to the court's ap-
proval. See ARIz. Sup. CT. RULE 28(c) VII A (1973), amended by, 110 Amz xxvii, xxxii (1974).
The majority examined the Rules and found the authority of the Arizona Supreme Court to
be more clearly defined than the role of the court in Bates. 104 S. Ct. at 1999 n.26.
20 433 U.S. 350 (1977). The Ronwin Court not only considered the Bates decision "di-
rectly pertinent," 104 S. Ct. at 1996, but found that the reliance by the federal court of
appeals on Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975), was "misplaced", 104 S. Ct.
at 1996 n.20.
' See Bates, 433 U.S. at 363; see infra notes 40-51 and accompanying text.
22 104 S. Ct. at 1997.
23 Id. at 1998.
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the real party in interest.24 The dissent maintained that the ex-
emption should not apply to the Committee because the anticom-
petitive conduct was not compelled by the state supreme court.2 5
Justice Stevens emphasized that state authorization of an activity
is insufficient to cloak the Committee with the immunity of the
sovereign. 2e The dissent determined that since the Arizona Su-
preme Court did not affirmatively decide to limit the number of
attorneys in the state, the conduct of the court was not under at-
tack and, thus, the Committee could not qualify for Parker
immunity.27
Although the Ronwin Court has extended the applicability of
the state action exemption, it is suggested that the holding of the
Court results in immunity for state representatives without consid-
ering whether their conduct was intended by the state. This Com-
ment will identify the weaknesses in the Court's reliance on the
Bates decision and will suggest that an investigation into the con-
duct of the party purporting to act on behalf of the state legisla-
ture or supreme court should be performed before that party is
accorded the protection of the state action exemption.
I. REQUIREMENT TO EXAMINE CONDUCT
A strong tradition of federalism requires that state policy sup-
plant federal statutes only when such action is not unduly burden-
some on interstate commerce or offensive to the Constitution.28
24 Id. at 2006 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens noted that Ronwin did not chal-
lenge any state policy, rather, he challenged only the alleged attempt to exclude even com-
petent attorneys from the practice of law in Arizona. Id. at 2005 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In
addition, the dissent noted that "a federal court may not dismiss a complaint for failure to
state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt.., that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts
which would entitle him to relief." Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting); see McClain v. Real Estate
Bd., 444 U.S. 232, 246-47 (1980); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974).
25 104 S. Ct. at 2006-10 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
16 Id. at 2007 (Stevens, J., dissenting). "Here . .. the [state supreme] court did not
require the Committee to grade the bar examination as it did." Id. The dissent noted that
the acts of the Committee did not qualify for Parker immunity because they did not pass
the "simple test for antitrust immunity" laid down in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421
U.S. 773, 790 (1975). 104 S. Ct. at 2006 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
2- 104 S. Ct. at 2007 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n
v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105 (1980) (no immunity when state authorized price
established by private parties); see also Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351 (1943) (state
cannot provide immunity by authorizing violation of Sherman Act).
21 See generally G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 256-342
(10th ed. 1980); J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 267-70 (1978).
When states have been protective of local business by discriminating against outside compe-
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The federal antitrust laws, however, do not apply when the state
intends to displace competition with a scheme of regulation pursu-
ant to its legitimate police power.2" It is the responsibility of the
courts to harmonize these conflicting interests.30
tition, the Supreme Court has been willing to strike down state regulation. See, e.g., Polar
Ice Cream & Creamery Co. v. Andrews, 375 U.S. 361, 377 (1964); Dean Milk Co. v. Madison,
340 U.S. 349, 350 (1951); H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525, 545 (1949). For
a rationale supporting use of the Commerce Clause to eliminate Parker's interference with
federal trade policy, see Rahl, Resale Price Maintenance, State Action, and the Antitrust
Laws: Effect of Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 46 Nw. U.L. REV. 349, 370-72
(1951).
29 See California Retail Liquor Dealer's Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97,
105-06 (1980); New Motor Vehicle Bd. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96, 109 (1978); see also
P. AREEDA, supra note 5, at § 182 (discussing Sherman Act immunity for state action); 6 J.
VON KALINOWSKJ, supra note 1, § 46.03[2] [c], [3] (discussing state-sanctioned private action
and regulatory interest of state). State intent will not be lightly inferred. See infra note 53.
The legislative power and prerogatives of the states as sovereigns are severely limited by the
congressional "policy favoring competition." Richards, Reconciling the Tension Between
Anticompetitive Regulations and the Sherman Act: California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n
v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 19 Ami. Bus. L.J. 539, 539-40 (1982). For example, the Commerce
Clause may provide the basis for invalidating state laws that neutralize advantages belong-
ing to other states, see Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 527-28 (1935), or that
impose an artificial rigidity on the economic pattern of industry, see Toomer v. Witsell, 334
U.S. 385, 403-06 (1948). State laws that restrict competition also may be invalidated under
the first amendment. See, e.g., Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 384 (1977) (commercial
speech entitled to some first amendment protection); see also P. AREEDA & D. TURNER,
supra note 2, at (p) 219-20 (first amendment, Due Process, and Commerce Clause limita-
tions on anticompetive activity).
30 See Areeda, Antitrust Immunity for "State Action" After Lafayette, 95 HARv. L.
REV. 435, 436 (1981). In Midcal, the Court concluded that, in "appropriate situations, the
federal interest will override a conflicting state interest in alcohol regulation." 445 U.S. at
110. The determination of an appropriate situation would be made after recognizing the
burden that a state regulation imposes upon interstate commerce and weighing the interest
of the state in imposing that regulation against the federal interest in interstate commerce.
See id. at 110-11. One commentator has suggested that this balancing be done on a case-by-
case basis. See Note, The Effect of the Twenty-First Amendment on State Authority to
Control Intoxicating Liquors, 75 COLUz. L. REV. 1578, 1594 (1975).
In Ronwin, the majority apparently feared that such a case-by-case approach was un-
wise, and, therefore, dismissed Ronwin's complaint. 104 S. Ct. at 2002 n.34. According to
Justice Stevens, the Ronwin Court was unduly concerned that numerous suits involving
lengthy and expensive litigation would overburden the courts. Id. at 2010-11 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). There appears to be some potential for an increase in litigation since the partic-
ular grading procedure that Ronwin attacked is widely used. See S. DuHL, THE BAR ExAMi-
INER's HANDBOOK 303-09 (2d ed. 1980). Examination duties similar to those in Ronwin are
delegated by every state judiciary. See id. at 15-16. Additionally, a great number of people
are expected to fail bar exams every year. For example, in 1981, nearly 20,000 applicants
failed bar examinations in American jurisdictions. Smith, 1981 Bar Examination Statistics,
51 BAR EXAMINER, May 1982, at 1, 27. Although antitrust claims are easily alleged, Areeda,
supra, at 451-53, and difficult to resolve before trial, see Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting
Sys., 368 U.S. 464, 473 (1962), the Supreme Court has rejected the "clogged courts" justifi-
cation in a recent state action case, see Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder,
1985]
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The state action exemption is applicable only when state pol-
icy is being carried out.s3 Thus, the conduct of state representa-
tives must be examined to prevent parties who are motivated by
private interests from being cloaked with immunity.3 2 Therefore,
the nature and extent of the Arizona Supreme Court's approval of
the Rules and delegation of authority to the Committee is of pri-
mary importance in determining whether the anticompetitive ac-
tivity of the Committee furthers state policy.33
Absent sufficient approval and supervision of the conduct by
the sovereign, the inquiry need go no further, for state action
would be lacking ab initio.3 4 However, the inquiry in Ronwin fo-
cused on the relationship between the Arizona Supreme Court and
the Committee, as defined by the court's power to admit or deny
applicants to the state bar.3 5 The majority concluded that there
should be no antitrust scrutiny because "the actions of the Com-
mittee [could not] be divorced from the Supreme Court's exercise
of its sovereign powers."3 6 Thus, the Committee was found to be
455 U.S. 40, 56 (1982) (rejecting argument that denial of exemption will unduly burden
courts).
31 See supra note 6.
32 See California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97,
103-05 (1980) (state involvement in conduct insufficient to establish immunity); New Motor
Vehicle Bd. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96 (1978) (state action sufficient for exemption).
The Louisiana statute in issue in City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S.
389 (1978), authorized the city to construct and maintain electric systems both within and
without the city limits. See LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 33:621, :1326 (West 1951 & Supp. 1985),
§§ 33:4162, :4163 (West 1966). Nevertheless, the Lafayette plurality found that the munici-
pality was subject to the Sherman Act because there was no indication that anticompetitive
conduct was contemplated. 435 U.S. at 414-15.
13 See 1 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 2, 1 211; ANTrRUST LAW AND LocAL Gov-
ERNMENT 15-16 (R. Siena ed. 1982); Comment, supra note 6, at 908.
' See, e.g., Boulder, 455 U.S. at 55-56 (requirement for state action not satisfied when
state's position is one of mere neutrality); Midcal, 445 U.S. at 105-06 (no immunity when
state simply authorizes and enforces anticompetitive conduct); Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 416
(antitrust laws must be obeyed when state itself has not authorized or directed anticompeti-
tive practice). The Supreme Court has dictated that the state action exemption may not
apply absent "extensive official oversight". Midcal, 445 U.S. at 104; see also Euster v. Eagle
Downs Racing Ass'n, 677 F.2d 992, 994 (3d Cir. 1982) (conduct must be actively supervised
by state for immunity from antitrust liability), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1022 (1983); Morgan v.
Division of Liquor Control, 664 F.2d 353, 356 (2d Cir. 1981) (state-action requirement of
active supervision satisfied by detailed mechanism for determining prices).
" See 104 S. Ct. at 1998-2001. Although the Arizona Supreme Court delegated the ad-
ministration of the admissions process, the majority focused on the requirement that the
recommendations of the Committee ultimately be approved by the state supreme court. Id.
at 1997-98.
38 Id. at 1996. Although the Court recognized the standards of clear articulation and
active supervision developed and refined throughout the Goldfarb, Bates, Lafayette, Mid-
1985] STATE ACTION EXEMPTION
within the state action exemption because of its status as a closely
regulated state agent.37 However, regardless of the relationship
with the state, not every act of a state agent qualifies for Parker
immunity.38 Unless the Court intended to give the Committee a
status equal to that enjoyed by the state supreme court and legis-
lature, it is submitted that the majority erred in granting immu-
nity based on the relationship of the Committee to the Arizona
Supreme Court.
II. INAPPLICABILITY OF Bates v. State Bar
Justice Powell observed that dismissal was proper because the
reasoning in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona "applies with greater
force to the Committee and its actions."39 It is suggested, however,
that closer analysis of the Bates decision reveals that the state ac-
tion exemption was not intended to be applied to the Committee.
In Bates, the plaintiff challenged a disciplinary rule adopted
by the Arizona Supreme Court and enforced by the state bar,
which prohibited commercial advertising by attorneys. 0 The plain-
tiffs argued that the mere adoption by the court of the restriction
against lawyer advertising was insufficient to qualify as state ac-
cal, and Boulder decisions, the majority stated that the tests did not apply if the conduct in
question was that of the state legislature or supreme court. Id. at 2000-01. The Court ob-
served that when the anticompetitive conduct is that of a nonsovereign state representative,
the conduct must be "pursuant to a 'clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state
policy' to replace competition with regulation." Id. at 1995; see Boulder, 455 U.S. at 52;
Bates, 433 U.S. at 362. The Court also found the degree of "active supervision" by the state
legislature or supreme court to be relevant in inquiries concerning the activities of state
representatives. 104 S. Ct. at 1995; see Midcal, 445 U.S. at 105; Bates, 433 U.S. at 362;
Goldfarb, 421 U.S. at 791. It is submitted that the majority did not consider these tests
because their holding was based upon the premise that the conduct of the Committee was
that of the Arizona Supreme Court. See 104 S. Ct. at 1996.
37 See 104 S. Ct. at 1997-98. By not examining the conduct of the Committee, the
Ronwin Court has contradicted an earlier holding that "state agencies... are [not], simply
by reason of their status as such, exempt from the antitrust laws." Lafayette, 435 U.S. at
408. Affording the Committee automatic exemption simply because of its relationship to the
Arizona Supreme Court "wholly eviscerate[s] the concepts of clear articulation and affirma-
tive expression that the [Supreme Court's] precedents require." Boulder, 455 U.S. at 56; see
Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 411-12 (extending automatic exemption to municipalities would be
inconsistent with limitations set forth in Bates and Goldfarb).
See Boulder, 455 U.S. at 54; Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 412; Bates, 433 U.S. at 361-62.
39 104 S. Ct. at 1997.
40 433 U.S. at 354-56; see 17A ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. R. 29(a) (Supp. 1982-83) (original
version at ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. R. 29(a) (Supp. 1976), incorporating MODEL CODE OF PRO-
FESSIONAL REsPoNsmi.rry DR 2-101(B) (1976)).
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tion.41 The Bates Court disagreed, finding that the disciplinary
rule reflected the policy of the state regarding professional behav-
ior.42 The majority concluded that the anticompetitive rules were
subject to "pointed re-examination" by the Arizona Supreme
Court.43 The Court realized that "[a]lthough the state bar play[ed]
a part in the enforcement of the rules, its role is completely de-
fined by the court, [and is] .. .under its continuous supervi-
sion."'44 Thus, the Court concluded, the Arizona Supreme Court
was the real party in interest45 and, therefore, the state action ex-
emption, established in Parker should apply to the state bar.46
In Bates, the state supreme court not only adopted and ap-
proved the anticompetitive conduct, but also embodied it explicitly
in the Arizona Supreme Court Rules. 47 In Ronwin, by contrast, the
state supreme court gave the members of the Committee discretion
in compiling and grading the bar examination,48 precisely the con-
duct Ronwin claimed was anticompetitive.49 Unlike Bates, where
the anticompetitive conduct was "completely defined" and
adopted by the court itself but carried out by its agent, the state
supreme court in Ronwin merely authorized the Committee to de-
velop and administer the bar examinations.50 The anticompetitive
41 433 U.S. at 359.
42 Id. at 362. The Bates Court distinguished the situation in Cantor v. Detroit Edison
Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976), where the anticompetitive practice was instigated by a utility com-
pany with only the acquiescence of the state regulatory commission. See Bates, 433 U.S. at
362.
43 433 U.S. at 362. The active supervision by the Arizona Court of the implementation
of the rules in the course of judicial enforcement proceedings was a significant factor in
allaying the apprehension of the Bates Court that federal policy was being disregarded. Id.;
see also Areeda, supra note 30, at 438 (dispositive factor in Bates was that highest court of
state circumscribed authority and actively supervised conduct). The extensive supervision of
the anticompetitive activity was essential for immunity because such supervision lessened
the concern of the Court that "federal policy [was] being unnecessarily and inappropriately
subordinated to state policy." 433 U.S. at 362.
4 433 U.S. at 361 (emphasis added).
45 Id.
46 Id. at 363.
47 Id. at 359-60. The state supreme court's adoption of the rule was the critical distinc-
tion that resulted in immunity in Bates since it signified that the conduct was required by
the sovereign. See id. at 360; Goldfarb, 421 U.S. at 791. Vhen the conduct is required by the
sovereign, it is clear that the state contemplated and approved the anticompetitive activity.
See Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 415; Goldfarb, 421 U.S. at 791-93.
18 104 S. Ct. at 1997. The Court conceded that the rule "authorized the Committee to
determine an appropriate 'grading or scoring system."' Id.
' Id. at 1994; see supra note 12 and accompanying text.
104 S. Ct. at 1997; see supra note 19 and accompanying text.
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conduct of grading the exam on a curve, unlike the authority to
develop a grading formula, was not embodied in any Arizona Su-
preme Court Rule.5 1
Mere approval of an agent's conduct is insufficient to express
the intent of the state to restrain competition.5 2 Thus, the analysis
of the Ronwin Court is defective in that there is no indication that
the Arizona Supreme Court intended that the Committee engage
in anticompetitive activity.53 Since the activity at issue clearly was
not mandated, nor even suggested, by the state supreme court, the
Committee could not be said to have acted pursuant to state pol-
icy.5 4 To assume that the court intended the Committee to displace
federal antitrust laws would result in boundless Parker immu-
nity.5 5 Indeed, the implication of Ronwin is that immunity will be
granted to a state agent solely because of its status, regardless of
"I See 104 S. Ct. at 1997.
52 See Boulder, 455 U.S. at 55; Midcal, 445 U.S. at 105-06; Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 413-
17. Since the Supreme Court has already stressed that mere neutrality toward the anticom-
petitive conduct of a state subdivision is insufficient for immunity, Boulder, 455 U.S. at 55,
it is submitted that conduct that is not even suggested by the state supreme court should
not entitle the agent to immunity. The Committee's anticompetitive conduct, scaled grading
of the exam, was not expressed in the Arizona Supreme Court Rules. See supra note 19. It is
questionable that the state even authorized the Committee to employ an anticompetitive
grading policy, though such authorization would be insufficient for Parker immunity. See
Midcal, 445 U.S. at 105.
53 See Areeda, supra note 30, at 438. Not only must the state actively supervise the
anticompetitive activity, it must also intend to replace the antitrust laws with a regulatory
scheme. Id. It has been noted that Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976), im-
plies that state approval, even if deliberate, is insufficient to displace antitrust laws. See
Areeda, supra note 30, at 439 n.19. State action immunity does not require compulsion of
the challenged conduct, however, the state must intend the anticompetitive effect. See La-
fayette, 435 U.S. at 413, 414-15. Indeed, even the Parker Court realized the exemption was
not intended to be so freely applied. See Parker, 317 U.S. at 350-52. In Parker, the Court
noted that "a state does not give immunity to those who violate the Sherman Act by author-
izing them to violate it, or by declaring that their action is lawful." Id. at 351; see also
Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 333, 344-47 (1904) (by virtue of authority
vested in Congress by Constitution to regulate commerce, its action "must be respected").
" It is submitted that simply because the court gave the Committee discretion in the
grading of bar examinations does not mean that the Committee also had the discretion to
impose restraints on competition. The Arizona Rules state no subjective criteria, other than
competence to practice law and good moral character, that are necessary for admission to
the bar. See ARiz. Sup. CT. R. 28(c) (1973).
51 Some courts have incorrectly granted immunity to private parties upon the finding of
any state regulatory activity. See, e.g., Washington Gas & Light Co. v. Virginia Electric &
Power Co., 438 F.2d 248, 252 (4th Cir. 1971); Sun Valley Disposal Co. v. Silver State Dispo-
sal Co., 420 F.2d 341, 342 (9th Cir. 1961). Assuming intent from bare state regulation or
supervision would permit private parties to circumvent the federal antitrust laws even if the
conduct is not reasonably related to state motives. See Areeda, supra note 30, at 447-48.
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whether the agent engaged in anticompetitive activity of a private
nature.56 Granting immunity without determining whether the
conduct was intended is contrary to the basis for exempting state
action in the first instance.57
III. WHICH STATE AGENTS ARE IMMUNE?
The Supreme Court has declared that only two bodies are ipso
facto exempt from the Sherman Act, the state legislature when
adopting legislation,5" and the state supreme court when acting in
a legislative capacity."" Justice Powell conceded that a "[c]loser
analysis is required when the activity at issue is not directly that of
the legislature or supreme court, but is carried out by others pur-
suant to state authorization."60 This "closer analysis" is necessary
to determine whether the anticompetitive conduct is undertaken
pursuant to state policy or is merely the product of a private an-
ticompetitive scheme. 1
While the Court noted the criteria for determining whether
state action exists, 2 it is submitted that the reluctance of the
Court to isolate the conduct of the Committee resulted in an un-
availing opinion that contradicts the serviceable framework for
analysis of state action issues already in existence. The activities of
a state representative, such as the Committee, must be presumed
56 See supra note 37. Parties have been granted the exemption in instances when state
policy was general and vague, but only because it was clear that the state contemplated an
anticompetitive effect. See Princeton Community Phone Book, Inc. v. Bate, 582 F.2d 706,
717 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 966 (1978). Conferring immunity based upon status is
erroneous because it would result in exemption regardless of whether the state contem-
plated the activity. See Boulder, 455 U.S. at 55.
7 See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
" See Parker, 317 U.S. at 350-51.
See Bates, 433 U.S. at 359-63.
60 Ronwin, 104 S. Ct. at 1995.
01 See Midcal, 445 U.S. at 103-05; Fox, 439 U.S. at 109. Midcal and Fox identify two
factors as prerequisites to receiving an exemption under the Parker doctrine: (1) a "clearly
articulated and affirmatively expressed" intention of the state to replace competition with
regulation, and (2) the assumption by the state of an active supervisory role over the an-
ticompetitive conduct. 445 U.S. at 105; 439 U.S. at 109. The two-step test for application of
the state action exemption reflects the Bates test, see Bates, 433 U.S. at 361, but does not
consider the regulatory interest of the state in the activity. Such a restatement of the state
action standard originally articulated in Lafayette appears to sanction a more responsible
approach by reducing the ability of the Court to scrutinize the wisdom or desirability of
state legislation. See Page, Antitrust, Federalism, and the Regulatory Process: A Recon-
struction and Critique of the State Action Exemption After Midcal Aluminum, 61 B.U.L.
REV. 1099, 1124-25 (1981); see also 1 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 2, T 215c.
62 104 S. Ct. at 1995-96; see supra note 36.
1985] STATE ACTION EXEMPTION
independent of the supreme court or legislature for the purpose of
determining whether a particular act qualifies for Parker immu-
nity.6" Although the acts of the state supreme court and legislature
are exempted automatically, a party delegated authority by the
state is subject to the antitrust laws unless its conduct was pursu-
ant to a clearly articulated state policy and was actively supervised
by the state. 4
The initial requirement for granting immunity is that the state
representative is acting in a manner contemplated by the state leg-
islature or supreme court.6 5 While the determination of whether
the state has intended the anticompetitive activity may require
some introspection,66 the Court has already outlined an approach
to this inquiry.6 7 In Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, " the Court
stated that the threshold inquiry is whether the anticompetitive
11 It is submitted that the legislature and supreme court should not be fictionally ex-
tended since this is the only realistic way to determine whether it is the conduct of the state
or a state agent that is at issue. Obviously, the focus of the inquiry must be on the nature of
the action intended. 6 J. VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 1, § 46.03[2]. Isolation of the anticom-
petitive conduct is relevant when determining whether the conduct is within the agent's
authority. See, e.g., Feminist Women's Center v. Mohammud, 586 F.2d 530, 536 (5th Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 924 (1979); Hennessey v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n,
564 F.2d 1136, 1149 (5th Cir. 1977); Duke & Co. v. Foerster, 521 F.2d 1277, 1280 (3rd Cir.
1975).
" See supra note 32. At least one court has reasoned that the public need not be so
cautiously protected from antitrust violations of governmental bodies because the people
have direct recourse through voting. See Deak Perera Hawaii v. Department of Transp., 553
F. Supp. 976, 980-81 (D. Hawaii 1983), aff'd, 745 F.2d 1281 (9th Cir. 1984). The Lafayette
Court also noted that public welfare could be protected through the electoral control of
government. See 435 U.S. at 406. Nevertheless, this rationale provides no remedy for parties
injured by state agents, such as the Committee, who are appointed rather than elected. See,
e.g., ARiz. Sup. CT. R. 28(a).
'5 See 1 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 2, 213f. The Midcal test has been used
by lower courts to determine whether the state has, by statute or judicial decision, contem-
plated the anticompetitive activity. See, e.g., Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los An-
geles, 726 F.2d 1430, 1433-34 (9th Cir. 1984); United States v. Southern Motor Carriers Rate
Conference, 702 F.2d 532, 538-39 (5th Cir. 1983), rev'd, 53 U.S.L.W. 4422 (U.S. Mar. 27,
1985) (No. 82-1922); Pueblo Aircraft Serv. v. City of Pueblo, 679 F.2d 805, 808 (10th Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1126 (1983).
68 See Slater, supra note 4, at 91; see also Richards, supra note 29, at 541-42 (court
needs to examine national policy favoring competition in relation to sovereignty of states).
67 See Midcal, 445 U.S. at 105. The simple two-step test developed in Midcal, requiring
that (1) the conduct be pursuant to clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state
policy, and (2) the policy be actively supervised by the state itself, was also adopted by
Justice Stevens in the Ronwin dissent. 104 S. Ct. at 2004 (Stevens, J., dissenting). According
to Justice Stevens, the Midcal test would minimize the risk that public power would be
exercised for private benefit. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
as 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
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activity is required by the state acting as sovereign. 9 Compulsion
of the challenged conduct, though not necessary,7 0 is forceful evi-
dence of state action.7
In the absence of compulsion, the challenged conduct must be
pursuant to a "clearly articulated" state policy intending to replace
the federal antitrust scheme with state regulation. 2 Examination
19 Id. at 790. The Goldfarb Court refused to grant immunity to a county bar association
that published minimum fee schedules that constituted price-fixing in violation of the Sher-
man Act. Id. at 788, 791-92. The county bar, a voluntary association, not a state agency,
claimed that it was prompted by the state bar to issue the fee schedules. Id. at 790. The
Court held that the state action exemption did not apply because neither the Virginia Su-
preme Court nor the state legislature mandated the price floors. Id. Furthermore, the Court
implied a requirement that the state exhibit an active interest in an anticompetitive scheme
before Parker immunity is granted, stating that there was "no indication. . . that the Vir-
ginia Supreme Court approves the opinions." Id. at 791.
70 See Areeda, supra note 30, at 438 n.19, 445 n.49; 1 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra
note 2, 215b2. State action immunity does not require that the sovereign compel the an-
ticompetitive conduct, however, it does require that there be "state supervision of private
acts in furtherance of a state effort to displace the market competition protected by federal
antitrust laws." 1 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 2, T 215b2. The requirements of state
supervision and intention protect the interest of the state in being granted immunity while
preventing the injury the antitrust laws were intended to prevent. Id.
7' See Note, supra note 6, at 913-20.
7'2 Boulder, 455 U.S. at 54; see 1 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 2, 1 214(e). The
compulsion test was designed to prevent the federal interest in competition from being in-
advertently subordinated to the interest of the state in regulation. See Cantor v. Detroit
Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 595 (1976). In Bates, however, the Court rejected this require-
ment, stating that the Sherman Act does not necessarily "prevail over the state interest in
regulating the bar . . . because the [state action] is not tailored so as to intrude upon the
federal interest to the minimum extent necessary." 433 U.S. at 360-61. The Bates Court
required only that the state or its agent intend by its action to confer antitrust immunity
and that the state clearly expresses this intention. Id. at 362; see Note, supra note 6, at 907-
08.
The Supreme Court has stressed the importance of a clearly-articulated policy in two
state-action cases decided since Ronwin. In Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 53
U.S.L.W. 4418 (U.S. Mar. 27, 1985) (No. 82-1832), a unanimous Court held that municipali-
ties need not satisfy the active supervision requirement of Midcal, id. at 4421. Although
state supervision is required due to the "real danger" presented by action by private parties,
id. at 4422, municipalities need only demonstrate that "the statutes clearly contemplate
that a city may engage in anticompetitive conduct," id. at 4420. In Southern Motor Carriers
Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States, 53 U.S.L.W. 4422 (U.S. Mar. 27, 1985) (No. 82-
1922), the Court held that the two-prong test of Midcal must be satisfied by private parties
claiming immunity. Id. at 4425. The majority found that the clearly-articulated policy re-
quirement was satisfied only if the anticompetitive conduct-in this case, collective
ratemaking by common carriers-was "clearly sanctioned by the legislatures of the . . .
[s]tates." Id. at 4426. The Court held the activities to be exempt because the state legisla-
ture had, in each case, either "expressly permitted" the anticompetitive conduct, or, "articu-
lated clearly [an] intent to displace price competition among common carriers with a regula-
tory structure." Id. at 4426-27. It is suggested that both Town of Hallie and Southern
Motor Carriers indicate that the anticompetitive conduct must be contemplated by the
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of the relationship between the state and the anticompetitive con-
duct, not that between the state and its representative, must reveal
an affirmatively expressed state policy.73 Requiring clear articula-
tion of the policy behind the anticompetitive activity ensures that
the conduct is that of the state and not the design of a private
party.74 Additionally, to qualify for exemption, the anticompetitive
conduct must be actively supervised by the state.75 Only when the
state has substituted its own supervision for the economic con-
straints of the competitive market will the state agent be granted
immunity.76 The degree of sovereign regulation was noted in Bates,
state for the exemption to apply.
73 See Boulder, 455 U.S. at 54; supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text. Where there
is no other indication of the limits of a state officer's duty or of the extent of state approval,
the requirement that a state policy be clearly expressed is the most responsible approach,
because it ensures that the federal policy embodied in the antitrust laws is not unintention-
ally displaced by the state. This requirement also guarantees that the state will not be pre-
vented by the antitrust laws from engaging in anticompetitive conduct pursuant to legiti-
mate state policy, as long as the purpose of the state is clear. See Areeda, supra note 30, at
447-48.
74 See Midcal, 445 U.S. at 105 (challenged activity must be expressed as state policy).
The national policy in favor of competition is not displaced when the state merely autho-
rizes and enforces conduct by private parties. Id. at 105-06. Clear articulation of state policy
designed to displace antitrust law was present in the statute in Midcal. Id. at 105; see CAL.
Bus. & PROF. CODE § 24,866 (West 1964) (repealed 1980). Similarly, the decisive factor in
Parker was that the state legislature had articulated a clear "intent to restrict competition
among. . . growers and maintain prices" when it passed the Agricultural Prorate Act and
required adherence to any marketing plan the commission adopted. 317 U.S. at 346-47.
75 Midcal, 445 U.S. at 105. The lack of active supervision, as evidenced by the failure of
the state to "monitor market conditions or engage in any 'pointed re-examination' of the
[anticompetitive] program," was cited by the majority in Midcal. Id. at 106. The Court
found that the California system for wine pricing met the clearly articulated standard be-
cause the "legislative policy [was] forthrightly stated and clear in its purpose to permit
resale price maintenance." Id. at 105. Nevertheless, the Mideal Court held that the state
action exemption was inapplicable because the program did not meet the second require-
ment for Parker immunity; thus, although the resale price-maintenance and price-posting
statute of California was clearly articulated, the Parker exemption was denied because of
inadequate state supervision. Id. "[T]he State simply authorize[d] price setting and en-
force[d] the prices established" but did not review "the reasonableness of the price sched-
ules; nor [did] it regulate the terms of the fair trade contracts." Id. at 105-06.
71 See id. at 105-06; Corey v. Look, 641 F.2d 32, 36-37 (1st Cir. 1981); Stauffer v. Town
of Grand Lake, 1981-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) T 64,029, at 76,328 (D. Colo. Oct. 9, 1980), order
modified, No. 80-A-752 (D. Colo. Dec. 15, 1980). There cannot be immunity when a state
statute or rule creates a continuing, unsupervised power that will act anticompetitively. 1 P.
AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 2, T 213. Unless the statute itself-provides for active super-
vision, Parker immunity will not be granted. See, e.g., Ratino v. Medical Serv., 718 F.2d
1260, 1268 (4th Cir. 1983); Morgan v. Division of Liquor Control, 664 F.2d 353, 356 (2d Cir.
1981). Some courts, however, have declined to require active state supervision of the activi-
ties of municipalities and state agencies. See, e.g., Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 53
U.S.L.W. 4418, 4421 (U.S. Mar. 27, 1985) (No. 82-1832) (active state supervision require-
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in which the Court viewed the active supervision of an anticompe-
titive activity by the state as essential for application of the ex-
emption doctrine.7 The requirement that the activity be ade-
quately supervised affords protection against unwarranted
antitrust immunity,"8 while providing exemption for those activi-
ties that the Sherman Act was not intended to proscribe.79
CONCLUSION
Undoubtedly, the state action exemption is required when the
state supreme court or legislature acts through its representative to
effectuate state policy. Nevertheless, the justification for displacing
federal antitrust law requires that the conduct be evaluated with
respect to the intent of the state to replace competition with regu-
lation. The Ronwin Court's failure to examine the challenged con-
duct in light of state policy ignores the safeguards designed to pro-
tect competitive themes.
It appears that the blanket exemption granted to the Commit-
tee in Ronwin could result in frustration of federal policy without
concern for whether the activity represents legitimate state policy
or is merely private action. By declining to recognize that the chal-
lenged conduct must be the focus of the inquiry to ensure that it is
not private activity, it is submitted that the Supreme Court has
misapplied the "clearly articulated" and "actively supervised"
standards. Only if the relevant conduct is examined will considera-
ment should not be imposed on municipalities); Gold Cross Ambulance & Transfer v. Kan-
sas City, 705 F.2d 1005, 1014 (8th Cir. 1983) (state supervision over ambulance system of
city not required).
7 See Bates, 433 U.S. at 361-62. "[P]ointed re-examination" of the conduct by the
state is essential to prevent federal interests from being unnecessarily subordinated to pri-
vate interests. Id. at 361; see P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 2, 211; ANTITRUST LAW
AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 15-16 (R. Siena ed. 1982). The Bates Court apparently believed
that even if the state showed independent interest in promulgating the disciplinary regula-
tion, unless the regulation expressed a vital state policy, the state bar association would still
be subject to liability under the Sherman Act. 433 U.S. at 361-62; see Areeda, supra note 30,
at 438; Note, The State Action Exemption and Antitrust Enforcement Under the Federal
Trade Commission Act, 89 HARv. L. REV. 715, 722-24 (1976).
78 See 1 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 2, at 213a.
79 See Fox, 439 U.S. at 109. In the situation in which a competitive market will not
adequately meet the public need for services-for example, the provision of garbage collec-
tion, public transportation, airport facilities, or water-a state may find it useful to monopo-
lize the supply of such services. See, e.g., E.W. Wiggins Airways v. Massachusetts Port
Auth., 362 F.2d 52, 55 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 947 (1966).
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tion of these criteria provide adequate protection for both state
and federal interests.
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